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I. INTRODUCTION
Our country was founded on the principle that there are fundamen-
tal human rights that should be beyond the reach of any govern-
ment-not just a king, not just an elected executive, but any gov-
ernment, includingI even a majority of the representative Congress
or state legislature.
On July 22, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives passed House
Bill 3313, which strips original jurisdiction from federal courts and the
Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction over same-sex marriage
cases. 2 This bill comes at a time in our nation's history when our country
is as politically divided as it has been in the past 150 years, when particu-
larly divisive issues define voting patterns, and when many citizens be-
lieve that the Supreme Court has become much too political for its own
good.3 Additionally, House Bill 3313 comes before the Senate in the
wake of eleven new state constitutional amendments passed in 2004 that
define marriage as solely between a man and a woman,4 with Texas join-
ing that group in November 2005. In total, eighteen states have constitu-
tional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage and forty states have
f J.D., magna ceum laude, Seattle Univ. School of Law, May 2006, B.A., History/Political Science,
Univ. of Wash., 2001.
1. Remarks of Archibald Cox, reprinted in NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1981.
2. Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004) ("No court created by Act
of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction,
to hear or decide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitu-
tion of, Section 1738C or this section." ).
This bill would amend 28 U.S.C. § 1632 (2005). Id.
3. See generally THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? How
CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA 1-5 (2004).
4. Thomas Roberts & Sean Gibbons, Same Sex Marriage Bans Winning on State Ballots, CNN,
Nov. 3, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/1 1/02/ballot.samesex.marriage.
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laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.5 The House passed House Bill 3313
with the intent to take certain "political" issues out of the hands of the
courts 6 and, in light of the political atmosphere of the country today, the
bill may be the first true subject matter jurisdiction-stripping bill to be-
come law.
On its face, Article III of the Constitution seems to give Congress
the power to limit federal courts' original jurisdiction and the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
vests the judicial power of the United States in the Supreme Court, "and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.",7 Commentators agree that Congress' power to create inferior
federal courts includes the lesser power of granting and limiting jurisdic-
tion to those courts.8 Additionally, Article III, Section 2 grants appellate
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, "with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make." 9 The Exceptions and Regula-
tions Clause seems to explicitly provide Congress with the power to limit
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. In the Judiciary Act of
1789,10 Congress interpreted the Exceptions and Regulations Clause just
this way, creating a congressional mandate for Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court has tacitly accepted this statutory
grant of jurisdiction ever since.11
5. ALASKA CONST. art. I § 25; ARK. CONST. amend. III; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4; HAW
CONST. art. 1, § 23; KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16; KY. CONST. § 233A; LA CONST. art. XII, § 15;
MICH. CONST. art. § 25; MISS. CONST. §263-A; MO. CONST., art. I, § 33; NEB. CONST. art. 1,
§ 29; NEV. CONST. art I, § 21; OH. CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. I1, § 35; OR.
CONST. art. XV, § 5a; 3 PA. CONST. STAT. §1704; TEX. CONST. art. ,§ 32; UTAH CONST.
art. 1, § 29; see also Human Rights Campaign, at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=
FederalConstitutionalMarriageAmendment&CONTENTID=20716&TEMPLATE=/TaggedPage/
TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=66 (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
6. John Hostettler, Protecting Marriage by Constraining the Courts, at http://www.house.gov/
hostettler/lssues/Hostettler-issues-2003-10-17-constraining-courts.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I11, § 1.
8. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 12 (2d Ed. 1973); Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Martin H. Redish, Consti-
tutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Profes-
sor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 143, 145 (1982).
9. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
10. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § I Stat. 73 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1259
(2005)).
11. Lawrence G. Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 24-25 (1981); see also Durousseau v.
United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810).
When the first legislature of the union proceeded to carry the third article of the constitu-
tion into effect, they must be understood as intending to execute the power they pos-
sessed of making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. They have
not, indeed, made these exceptions in express terms. They have not declared that the ap-
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In his law review article, Professor Henry Hart responded to the
questions of whether Congress had unlimited control of federal jurisdic-
tion and whether this control was consistent with other provisions in the
Constitution.' 2 Though Professor Hart's article has been widely de-
bated,13 his overarching thesis is generally accepted:' 4 Congress' power
to restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction is bound by the requirement that
the Court's "essential functions" may not be trammeled, but Congress'
power to restrict lower federal court jurisdiction is broad.' 5
This Comment will build on Professor Hart's thesis, arguing that
the essential functions of the federal judiciary are broader than what he
and later commentators have purported. The federal judiciary's jurisdic-
tion is protected by a three-tiered "essential functions" restriction.' 6 First,
Congress may not abridge federal courts' essential functions within the
tripartite system.' 7 Secondly, Congress may not abridge federal courts'
essential functions as the "judicial power of the United States."' 8 Finally,
Congress may not violate any individual constitutional liberty in exercis-
ing its jurisdictional powers.' 9 Ultimately, by expanding Professor Hart's
essential functions thesis, this Comment will demonstrate that this three-
step test is necessary to analyze the constitutionality of any jurisdiction-
stripping act within our tripartite system of government.
Part II of this Comment will summarize the various theories of
Congress' jurisdictional powers. Part III will examine the historical and
philosophical roots of the Constitution and Congressional power. This
section will illustrate that the framers' intent and the wording of the Con-
stitution prevent Congress from altering the constitutional plan or pre-
venting federal courts from performing its essential functions. Part IV
will apply the preceding analysis to House Bill 3313 and ultimately con-
clude that Congress does not have the power to strip any federal court of
the jurisdiction to hear same-sex marriage cases.
pellate power of the court shall not extend to certain cases; but they have described af-
firmatively its jurisdiction, and this affirmative description has been understood to imply
a negative on the exercise of such appellate power as is not comprehended within it.
Id.; see also United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172-73 (1805).
12. See Hart, supra note 8, at 1363.
13. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 11; Redish, supra note 8; Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods,
Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a
New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 61-66 (1975).
14. See generally Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional Control Over the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts: A New Threat to James Madison's Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417, 417-18
(2000).
15. Hart, supra note 8, at 1365.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Hart, supra note 8, at 1365; U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.
19. Hart, supra note 8, at 1365.
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II. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
CONGRESSIONAL JURISDICTION-STRIPPING POWER
The crux of the debate surrounding congressional jurisdiction-
stripping power is the question of whether state courts are proper fora for
the adjudication of federal issues. The first scholars to address this issue
based much of their analysis on the assumption that state courts and fed-
eral courts have coequal abilities to interpret federal issues.20 This as-
sumption led these scholars to conclude that Congress' power to strip
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction is broad. 21 Recently, how-
ever, many scholars have rejected this traditional position because they
believe that state courts cannot sufficiently adjudicate many federal is-
sues. 22 Although this Comment takes a wholly different approach to this
debate, it is nonetheless important to understand the issue's ideological
and theoretical underpinnings.
A. Justice Story
The first person to question Congress' ability to limit subject matter
jurisdiction was Supreme Court Justice Story. In Martin v. Hunter's Les-
see,23 Justice Story argued that the language of "shall be vested" in Arti-
cle III, Section 1 meant that the entire federal judicial power must be
vested in some federal court.2 4 Justice Story argued that the word "shall"
was an imperative, mandating that a federal forum always be available
for federal questions. 25 Justice Story further contended that because Arti-
cle III vests judicial power wherever the Supreme Court lacks original
jurisdiction, it logically follows that "[C]ongress are bound to create
some inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under
the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United States, and of which
the [S]upreme [C]ourt cannot take original cognizance. 26
B. Professor Hart
Justice Story's assertions lay fallow until the 1950s when Professor
Henry Hart sowed the seeds of the modem debate. In 1953, Professor
Hart published a law review article in the form of an imaginary conversa-
tion between two interlocutors in which he argued that Congress had
plenary control over the jurisdiction of lower federal courts and control
20. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 8, at 1363-64; Redish, supra note 8, at 145.
21. Hart, supra note 8, 1363-64; Redish, supra note 8, at 145.
22. Anderson, supra note 14, at 426.
23. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
24. Id. at 331.
25. Id.
26. Id.; see also Redish & Woods, supra note 13, at 56-57.
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over Supreme Court jurisdiction so long as the Supreme Court's essential
functions were not abridged.27 Professor Hart's article, because it was the
first and most influential, is the jumping off point for this subject.
Professor Hart based his essential function argument on his reading
of Ex Parte McCardle.28 In McCardle, the Supreme Court upheld legisla-
tion that deprived it of appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases by
interpreting the Exceptions and Regulations Clause' 9 as granting Con-
gress the power to confer to the Supreme Court whatever appellate juris-
diction Congress sees fit. 30 He based his essential function theory on the
argument that a broad reading of the Exceptions and Regulations Clause
would "authorize exceptions which engulf the rule."3' That is, Professor
Hart believed that the Exceptions and Regulations Clause gives Congress
explicit power to limit Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, but that to
interpret the clause too broadly would permit Congress to eliminate the
Supreme Court's power of appellate review, one of the essential func-
tions of the Supreme Court. Thus, Professor Hart argued that Congress'
power under the Exceptions and Regulations Clause was broad, but
could not be construed so broadly as to completely strip the Supreme
Court of appellate review.32
Professor Hart reasoned that the Supreme Court's essential func-
tions were not abridged in McCardle because the circuit courts remained
open to hear habeas corpus cases and the Supreme Court could still en-
tertain direct habeas corpus petitions.33 Thus, the McCardle court did not
destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional
plan.34
However, Professor Hart did not specifically enumerate which
functions were essential and he generally took a narrow view of such
things.35 He did not believe that the Constitution granted any right to
27. Hart, supra note 8, at 1365.
28. Id. at 1364-65; 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
29. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the
other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.
Id.
30. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 513.
31. Hart, supra note 8, at 1364. That is to say, if Congress were allowed to make Exceptions
and Regulations at will, the role of the Supreme Court could be whittled down to nothing at all.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1365.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1363-65.
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bring cases in federal courts36 and he further believed that the proper fo-
rum for all claims, constitutional or otherwise, was state court.37
With regard to restrictions on lower federal courts, Professor Hart
argued that congressional power was plenary. 38 He argued that denial of
federal court jurisdiction did not substantially affect a litigant's rights
because state courts are the proper forum to bring federal and constitu-
tional law questions.39 Once federal jurisdiction is stripped, a state court
may not disclaim jurisdiction because the court would then be under a
constitutional obligation to ensure that a forum exists for such a case.4 °
Thus, Congress may strip federal courts of all jurisdiction so long as one
forum remains, state or otherwise, which can grant a remedy to the par-
ties in the litigation. 41 As Professor Hart argued, "It's hard, for me at
least, to read into Article III any guarantee to a civil litigant of a hearing
in a federal constitutional court (outside the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court) if Congress chooses to provide some alternative proce-
dure."42
However, Professor Hart's analysis is problematic for several rea-
sons. First, if the lower federal courts were stripped of jurisdiction, be-
cause the Supreme Court would still be available to hear the case, the
state court may deny jurisdiction as well. 43 This would lead to the Su-
preme Court taking original jurisdiction over a case for which the Consti-
tution did not confer original jurisdiction. This analysis, then, essentially
pits two provisions of the Constitution against one another. Because in-
terpreting the Establish and Ordain Clause in such a way would lead to
its trumping an explicit provision in Article III, this analysis, at the very
least, requires more consideration. Second, as Professors Martin Redish
and Curtis Woods point out, Professor Hart's analysis fails when the
remedy sought requires the state court to issue an injunction to a federal
36. Id. at 1363.
37. Id. at 1401.
38. Id. at 1364.
39. Id.
40. Id. Professor Hart's reading of the Constitution, in this regard, predicts one crux of the
modern debate over Sovereign Immunity. As this Comment later shows, Congressional restrictions
of federal subject matter jurisdiction essentially force state courts to adjudicate federal laws, which,
when the cause of action is against the state, runs afoul of traditional notions of federalism. See infra
Part III.A.2; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
41. Hart, supra note 8, at 1366.
42. Id. at 1372-73.
43. Id. at 1364. If no federal forum exists, then the state court may not deny jurisdiction. How-
ever, if only lower court jurisdiction is stripped, a state court could, under Professor Hart's reason-
ing, deny jurisdiction without violating the litigants' constitutional rights because one forum-the
Supreme Court-still exists to hear the case. See id.
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officer because state courts do not possess injunctive power over federal
officials.44
C. Redish and Woods
In response to a flurry of jurisdiction-stripping bills proposed in the
House and Senate, commentators in the late 1970s and early 1980s again
took up the debate. Twenty-two years after Professor Hart's dialectic,
Martin Redish and Curtis Woods began the process by identifying a flaw
in Professor Hart's argument.45 In Tarble's Case, a Wisconsin state
court, under its power of habeas corpus, ordered the United States Army
to release an allegedly underage enlistee.46 The Supreme Court held that
state courts lacked the power to issue remedies that mandated actions by
federal officers.47 The Court reasoned that the federal government must
be free from such intrusions on its sovereignty in order to prevent "forci-
ble collision between the two governments., 48 Thus, Redish and Woods
argued that a state court could not be a sufficient forum for cases in
which the remedy sought involved an injunction of a federal officer be-
cause it lacked mandamus power over federal officers.49
Though essentially agreeing with Professor Hart's analysis, Redish
and Woods' analysis focused on an important limitation on Congress'
power over federal courts. Implicit in this argument is the assertion that
the judicial power of the United States exists, partially, to provide reme-
dies for its litigants. 50 Under this analysis, Congress may not restrict ju-
risdiction if it denies to a litigant the possibility of achieving the remedy
sought. This argument is essentially a reformulation of the Fifth
Amendment right of procedural due process. Therefore, Congress may
limit federal court jurisdiction so long as the litigant still has "the oppor-
tunity to be heard ... which must be granted at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner.",51 However, when a state court lacks the power to
44. Redish & Woods, supra note 13, at 63.
45. Id.
46.80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 398-400 (1871).
47. Id. at 406.
48. Id. at 407.
49. Redish & Woods, supra note 13, at 108. See also McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
598 (1821) (holding that state courts lack the power to issue writs of mandamus to federal officers).
But cf Pa. Turnpike Comm'n v. McGinnes, 179 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 278
F.2d 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 820 (state courts lack power to enjoin federal officers) with
Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 152 F. 200, 205 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1907) (state courts can enjoin federal
officers); c.f Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 664 n.13 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. See infra Part III.B.2. This is so because if the remedy were unimportant, the Supreme
Court in this case would have allowed the Wisconsin court to hear the case regardless of whether it
had the necessary mandamus power over the federal officer.
51. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)."
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fix the litigant's problem, the court clearly cannot provide a meaningful
hearing. This theme will be explored further in Part IV.
This procedural Due Process problem, however, is not limited
merely by a lack of mandamus or injunctive powers over federal officers.
State courts lack the power to command officers of other states as well.
Redish and Woods' analysis of Tarble's Case leads to an obvious but
important conclusion: the power to provide a remedy is an essential func-
tion of the judicial branch. Therefore, what Redish and Woods argued as
a flaw in Professor Hart's analysis was a rephrasing of the procedural
due process imperative.52
D. Professor Sager
Taking up Justice Story's thesis, Professor Lawrence Sager argued
that, taken as a whole, the "shall be vested" language, the congressional
power to create lower federal courts, the tenure and salary provision, and
the Exceptions and Regulations clause mandate that at least one Article
III court must remain open for litigants making constitutional claims.53
Thus, argues Sager, Congress may not limit federal court jurisdiction for
constitutional cases.5 4
Some commentators have argued that Professor Sager stretched the
framers' intentions somewhat to suit his purposes.55 However, his analy-
sis provides the foundation for a strong argument. One prong of Profes-
sor Sager's argument rests on the assertion that no congressional act may
violate the Constitution.56 This statement provides a great deal of ammu-
nition against jurisdiction stripping-statutes. Because the judiciary is the
branch of government vested with the power to interpret the Constitution
and laws of the country, judicial review must be an essential function of
Article III courts.5 7 As this Comment will show, the idea that judicial
review is an essential function of the federal judiciary is also consistent
with the history of the Constitutional Convention.
Another important point Professor Sager made is that the tenure and
salary provisions of Article III indicate that the framers intended federal
judges to be as independent as possible from outside influences. 58 Sager
argued that this provision prevents Congress from conferring jurisdiction
over certain cases to tribunals without Article III independence because
52. See infra Part lII.B.2.
53. Sager, supra note 11, at 66.
54. Id.
55. See Redish, supra note 8, at 146-49.
56. Sager, supra note II, at 68.
57. Id. at 66.
58. Id. at 61-63.
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to do so would render meaningless the tenure and salary provision.5 9 This
assertion makes sense, because the rationale behind the tenure and salary
provision is to ensure that federal judges are unbiased. Logically, fear of
losing one's job can contribute to bias. This assertion has important im-
plications if a federal cause of action is relegated to an elected state court
judge.
One can criticize Professor Sager for pitting the tenure and salary
provision against the clear language of the "ordain and establish" provi-
sion and for awarding victory to tenure and salary based only on specula-
tion as to the alternative interpretation's effect on the power of the tenure
and salary provision itself.6° However, Professor Sager's conclusion that
"Congress can regulate the adjudication of Article III business to the
state courts, but it must provide persons who advance claims of federal
constitutional right an opportunity to secure review-in some Article III
court--of the state court's disposition, 6 1 seems unassailable.
E. Mini-Conclusion
Ultimately, all of this judicial philosophical wrangling has failed to
establish a clearly delineated description of Congress' power to shape
federal court jurisdiction. However, there is at least one postulate on
which every scholar agrees: that Congress' power over Supreme Court
jurisdiction is significantly less than its power over lower federal court
jurisdiction.
To date, the debate over Congress' jurisdictional shaping authority
has focused solely on the relationship between the legislative and judicial
branch. However, by looking only at the two branches' relationship with
each other, this analysis fails in that it neglects to consider each branch's
respective role in the greater constitutional scheme. This Comment takes
a different approach by considering the Constitution as a whole and the
normative values that underlie the tripartite system of government.
III. THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
Combining the above theories on Congress' constitutional power to
limit jurisdiction, this Part expands the essential functions theory and
argues that the framers intended both the Supreme Court and lower fed-
eral courts to have more essential functions than Professor Hart or other
theorists have contemplated. Commentators have consistently structured
the debate into two categories: (1) Congress' power over Supreme Court
59. Id. at 62-63.
60. Redish, supra note 8, at 149-54.
61. Sager, supra note 11, at 66.
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jurisdiction, and (2) Congress' power over lower federal court jurisdic-
tion.6 z However, this paradigm falls short because, by compartmentaliz-
ing congressional power over the federal judicial hierarchy, it neglects to
consider the overarching role the framers intended for the "judicial
power of the United States., 63 This Part will demonstrate that the framers
intended, and the Constitution established, that all federal courts perform
certain essential functions. These functions include: (1) functions neces-
sary within the tripartite constitutional scheme, what this comment terms
"interbranch function"; (2) functions necessary for a properly functioning
judiciary within the federal system, or "intrabranch functions"; and (3)
functions necessary for upholding individual constitutional rights.
Accordingly, this analysis will be structured into two parts: (1) in-
terbranch, and (2) intrabranch functions of the federal judiciary. First, it
will be argued that the framers' overarching constitutional theme of
checks and balances mandates that federal courts act as a check on the
other two branches. As such, any jurisdictional restriction that abridges
federal judicial power to check legislative acts runs afoul of this most
essential constitutional imperative. Second, it will be shown that the
framers intended that the federal courts be superior to the state courts.
Consequently, any jurisdictional restriction that prevents federal courts
from ensuring that federal law trumps state law or that permits state
courts to interpret federal law without federal court review violates the
federal courts' essential role within the federal system.
A. Interbranch Essential Functions of the Judiciary
The French political philosopher Baron de Montesquieu is credited
with the idea of a tripartite system of government that consists of an ex-
ecutive, a legislative, and a judicial branch, with each branch acting as a
check on the other two. 6 4 The rationale behind Montesquieu's theory of
checks and balances, echoed by James Madison in Federalist 47, is sim-
ple: the rights of the people will be preserved so long as the three
branches of government are coequal and each has certain powers over
62. See Hart, supra note 8, at 1362; Redish, supra note 8, at 145; Sager, supra note 11, at 21.
This division is not surprising because the Constitution did not require Congress to create any lower
federal courts at all. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
63. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.
64. See CHARLES LouIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE LA BREDE ET DE MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 201 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748) ("In every
government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things depend-
ent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law."). See
also THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The oracle
who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu").
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the other branches.65 At its most basic level, this system is designed to
66prevent tyranny: tyranny by the minority and tyranny by the majority.
By distributing governmental power among the three branches, the Con-
stitution attempts to insulate the citizenry against any one branch using
its power in a harmful manner or depriving citizens of their constitutional
rights.67 Speaking of the courts' role in the constitutional scheme, James
Madison wrote, "[I]ndependent tribunals of justice will consider them-
selves in a peculiar manner the guardians of [constitutional] rights; they
will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in
the legislature or executive., 68 Similarly, in Federalist No. 78, Alexander
Hamilton described the role of an independent judiciary as follows: "In a
monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a
republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppres-
sions of the representative body." 69 Put more bluntly, the Constitution is
the sword with which the Supreme Court can delegitimize or refuse to
enforce legislative or executive acts. In order to ensure the proper func-
tioning of this tripartite system, the judiciary's sword may not be dulled
or stripped by a congressional act.70
At the Constitutional Convention, there was no question that the
new federal government would bring Montesquieu's political vision to
fruition.71 Nor was there any question that the framers would establish a
federal Supreme Court.72 However, there was a great deal of debate over
the powers and makeup of the federal judicial branch.73 Proposals ranged
from granting the Supreme Court the power to review all legislation be-
fore it was enacted, 74 to merely allowing the Supreme Court to declare
statutes unconstitutional when necessary.75 Ultimately, the theories be-
65. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one,
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny.").
66. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 333 (4th ed. 2001).
67. Id. at 334; see also Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 690 (1999). The protection of liberty requires that "governmental power, even-indeed,
especially-governmental power wielded by the people, had to be dispersed and countered." Id. at
690.
68. James Madison to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 1789-1790 197, 207 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979).
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
70. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
71. See BATOR ET AL, supra note 8, at 3; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 161 (1960).
72. BATOR ET AL, supra note 7, at 3.
73. Id. at 7-9.
74. ld.
75. Id. at 8.
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hind the creation of the federal system and behind the powers granted to
the federal judiciary are highly instructive.
Article 1II, on its face, gives Congress fairly broad power to limit
Supreme Court jurisdiction.7 6 However, if Madison's constitutional im-
perative to prevent tyranny is to be given proper credit, Article III power
cannot be used to alter the balance of power among the coequal branches
of government. Thus, the most salient essential requirement of the judici-
ary is that it must act as a check on the other governmental branches.
This essential judicial function limits congressional control over jurisdic-
tion in two ways. First, Congress cannot structure its jurisdictional limi-
tations in such a way that deprives federal courts of the power to review
legislative actions. Second, Congress cannot use a jurisdiction stripping
provision to achieve, through ordinary legislation, what it must otherwise
achieve through constitutional amendment. Put another way, Congress
cannot strip the Court of its power of judicial review and Congress can-
not usurp the Court's role as the interpreter of the laws of the United
States.
1. Judicial Review: The Power to Declare Statutes Unconstitutional
The framers took for granted that the Supreme Court would have
the power of judicial review. 77 Chief Justice Marshall famously iterated
this maxim in Marbury v. Madison,78 and there has never since been any
doubt about the Court's ability to do SO. 79 A few framers were concerned
that judicial review would usurp the legislative power Congress had ex-
plicitly protected by denying the Court the extra-judicial power to review
proposed legislation and to enable or prevent it from being enacted. 80
However, in the end, the Supreme Court was endowed with the power of
judicial review, the only power federal courts wield over the other
76. U.S. CONST. art III, § I ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to lime ordain and estab-
lish.") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned,
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.") (emphasis added).
77. BATOR ET AL, supra note 7, at 9.
78.5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
79. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 481 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("That there ought to be one court of supreme and final jurisdiction is a proposition which has not
been, and is not likely to be contested.").
80. BATOR ET AL, supra note 8, at 7. Governor Randolph had proposed that the Supreme Court
also act as a council of revision, determining the constitutionality of all legislation before it was
passed. The proposal was supported as a check on the legislative branch. However, this proposal was
roundly rejected because the Framers saw the Court's ability to rule on the constitutionality of legis-
lation after it was passed as sufficient to prevent Legislative aggrandizement. Id. at 8.
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branches of government.8' Therefore, no act of Congress can abridge this
power without altering the overall constitutional balance of power.
Although the Supreme Court's power of judicial review is unassail-
able, that position is not so clear in regard to the lower federal courts.
Under Article III, Congress has the power to create lower federal
courts.8 2 Thus, it is conceivable that Congress could have created lower
federal courts without the power of judicial review; Congress could have
chosen not to create lower federal courts at all. Indeed, the first Judiciary
Act did not grant lower federal courts the power to hear all Article III
cases, and the lower federal courts did not have general original federal
subject matter jurisdiction until 1875.8 3 Nonetheless, the use of the lan-
guage "judicial power" throughout Article III, without question confers
the power of judicial review to lower federal courts, once created 8 4 In
Federalist 81, Alexander Hamilton wrote,
The power of constituting inferior courts is evidently calculated to
obviate the necessity of having recourse to the Supreme Court in
every case of federal cognizance. It is intended to enable the na-
tional government to institute or authorize, in each State or district
of the United States, a tribunal competent to the determination of
matters of national jurisdiction within its limits.85
Congressional power to limit jurisdiction conflicts with federal
courts' power of judicial review in a number of ways. If Congress has the
power to limit jurisdiction, and the courts do not have the power to re-
view the constitutionality of a denial of jurisdiction, then the courts'
powers of judicial review are toothless; even jurisdiction stripping stat-
utes that are facially unconstitutional would be exempted from review.
This result would certainly run contrary to the framers' intent in granting
federal courts judicial review.8 6 Thus, courts, at the very least, still retain
the power to determine their own jurisdiction, in light of the constitution-
ality of Congress' grants or removals of jurisdiction.8 7 That being the
case, the fact that courts still retain the power to determine the constitu-
tionality of a removal of jurisdiction means that Congress' power to con-
81. THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at467-68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961).
82. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § I ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish") (italics added).
83. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
84. Indeed, the fact that lower federal courts act with precisely the same power as the Supreme
Court, minus the power to review their own decisions, is strong evidence for this supposition.
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 8 1, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
86. See BATOR ET AL, supra note 7, at 9.
87. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803); see also Sager, supra note 11, at 26.
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trol jurisdiction is limited.88 Inherent in this argument is that Congress
cannot restrict jurisdiction in such a way that would violate the constitu-
tional rights of the excluded litigants.8 9
What this analysis demonstrates, however, is that Congress' power
to limit jurisdiction is subject to at least one more very important limita-
tion. All federal courts have the constitutional power to make the thresh-
old determination of whether they have jurisdiction and whether a con-
gressional grant or removal of jurisdiction is constitutional.9" Therefore,
the power of judicial review limits Congress' power to create a jurisdic-
tional limitation that violates a constitutional right. If the Supreme Court
lacked the power to declare unconstitutional a limitation on its jurisdic-
tion, the balance of power would be impermissibly shifted to the legisla-
tive branch.
2. Separation of Powers: Maintaining the Federal Balance
The sword with which the judiciary arms itself to counter congres-
sional acts is the Constitution. Congress does have the power to alter the
Constitution, but it can only do so by amending it.91 The amendment
process is arduous, but with the power to amend at its disposal, Congress
has the ability to reforge the judiciary's sword. Therefore, if the Consti-
tution is to remain a viable judicial weapon, Congress cannot be allowed
to circumvent the prescribed amendment procedures of Article V and
achieve through ordinary legislation (i.e. through a jurisdiction-stripping
act) what would otherwise require a constitutional amendment.
In Federalist 49, James Madison, commenting on a future Article
V, wrote, "The danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting
too strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against a
frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decisions of the
whole society. ' ' 92 To Madison and others, the Constitution's vitality lay
in its long-term mutability and its short-term resistance to change.93 Any
88. Sager, supra note 11, at 26.
89. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
90. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
91. U.S. CONST. art V.
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
93. Indeed, that some questions are best resolved far from the caprice of the majority is en-
shrined in much case law as well. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 104-05 (Phillips Bradley, ed.,
Vintage Books 1945).
In France the constitution is, or at least is supposed to be, immutable; and the received
theory is that no power has the right of changing any part of it. In England the constitu-
tion may change continually, or rather it does not in reality exist; the Parliament is at
once a legislative and a constituent assembly. The political theories of America are more
simple and more rational. An American constitution is not supposed to be immutable, as
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act of Congress or act of judicial acquiescence that permits Congress to
achieve a de facto constitutional amendment violates the framers' inten-
tion to isolate the Constitution from the caprice of the general populace.
Article V explicitly lays out the means by which Congress may
amend the Constitution. 94 By making the Constitution difficult to amend,
the framers intended to ensure that the Constitution would only be al-
tered when there was overwhelming popular support for the proposed
change. 95 However, this clear intent would be contravened if the Excep-
tions and Provisions Clause were interpreted to allow Congress, through
a simple majority, to circumvent the amendment process and achieve a
de facto constitutional amendment. In one sense, this argument presup-
poses that, once a subject matter is relegated to state courts, the state
courts will be amenable to the will of Congress. Nevertheless, this pre-
supposition need not necessarily occur for a jurisdiction-stripping act to
achieve a de facto amendment.
For example, the intent of both House Bill 3313 and a constitutional
amendment defining marriage as between a man and a woman is to
maintain the matrimonial status quo. 96 House Bill 3313 achieves that end
by insulating the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) from legal chal-
lenge.97 A constitutional amendment achieves that end by enshrining cur-
rent marital mores under the rubric of the Constitution. Clearly, if the
will of the people is such that three-fourths of the states are willing to
ratify the amendment, then the goal will have legitimately been met.
However, using ordinary legislation to circumvent the arduous political
in France; nor is it susceptible of modification by the ordinary powers of society, as in
England. It constitutes a detached whole, which, as it represents the will of the whole
people, is no less binding on the legislator than on the private citizen, but which may be
altered by the will of the people in predetermined cases, according to established rules. In
America the Constitution may therefore vary; but as long as it exists, it is the origin of all
authority, and the sole vehicle of the predominating force.
Id.
94. U.S. CONST. art. V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Convention in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress.
Id.
95. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
96. See Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004); see also President
George W. Bush, Remarks in The Roosevelt Room, President Calls for Constitutional Amendment
Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/
20040224-2.html [hereinafter Remarks].
97. See Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004).
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road required for ratification violates the separation of powers doctrine in
two ways. First, the political process required to ratify an amendment to
the Constitution is a check on the amendment process itself. Second, us-
ing ordinary legislation to achieve an end otherwise necessitating consti-
tutional amendment violates the text of Article V.
Furthermore, ordinary legislation is not sufficient to overturn Su-
preme Court decisions. 9s Historically, there are two important examples
of congressional machinations that resulted in an amendment or altera-
tion to the types of cases over which federal courts have original jurisdic-
tion: the Judiciary Act of 178999 and the Eleventh Amendment.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not strip federal courts of any essen-
tial function, but rather altered the avenues by which a case may reach
federal court. 100 Likewise, in the face of Chisholm v. Georgia,10 ' Con-
gress could not have simply enacted a law mandating sovereign immu-
nity. Because the creation of sovereign immunity would have overturned
a prior Supreme Court decision and altered the overall federal balance of
power, it had to be enshrined in a constitutional amendment and not in
federal legislation. 10
2
Thus, any congressional attempt to overrule unpopular court deci-
sions by restricting Supreme Court jurisdiction over a class of cases must
be viewed as an attempt to overturn federal case law and achieve a de
facto amendment to the Constitution. Such an act must be unconstitu-
tional because, by essentially allowing Congress to "say what the law
is,''1°3 it contravenes Article V by shifting judicial power to the legisla-
ture. This is so because a restriction on jurisdiction is, at its core, Con-
gress acting as the Supreme Court would: determining a threshold for
what is justiciable.
B. Intrabranch Essential Functions of the Judiciary
In addition to requiring the federal judiciary to perform certain
functions in relation to the other branches of government, the Constitu-
98. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.)
419 (1793) (holding that states could be sued in federal court by citizens of other states).
99. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § I Stat. 73 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1259 (2005)).
100. Id. The Judiciary Act of 1789, one of the first acts of the new Congress, established lower
federal courts and federal appellate procedure. Id.
101. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1973).
102. Indeed, recent Supreme Court decisions on the subject of sovereign immunity have sup-
ported this claim. In Boerne, the Court expressly denied Congress' power to define substantive Four-
teenth Amendment rights, because the power to interpret the constitution is explicitly judicial, and to
allow Congress that power would alter the federal balance of powers. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
519.
103. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S 137, 177 (1803).
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tion also requires the federal judiciary to perform functions in relation to
state courts. 0 4 Historically, the balance of power between federal and
state courts has fluctuated, and the relationship between the two entities
is at the core of a great deal of constitutional debate.'0 5
At the Constitutional Convention, many framers believed that state
courts would generally act the way lower federal courts do today. 10 6 In-
deed, until the Judiciary Act of 1789 created the lower federal courts,
federal court authority over state court decisions was minimal. 0 7 By the
late 19th Century, nationalism was at its height and federal courts rou-
tinely overturned state court decisions. 108 Federal power over state courts
was high.'0 9 Consequently, in the 1930s the Supreme Court began creat-
ing prudential doctrines that were intended to be more sensitive to the
various interests of both state and federal governments." 0 The rationale
behind the doctrines that fall under the umbrella of "Our Federalism"'H
is highly instructive for deducing what essential roles the federal judici-
ary must play in relation to state courts. 12 Ultimately, the two essential
functions that federal courts must perform in relation to state courts are:
(1) to ensure the supremacy of federal law, and (2) to provide remedies
unavailable in state courts.
104. "1 have never been able to see," James Madison wrote in 1832 commenting on the federal
courts, how "the Constitution itself could have been the supreme law of the land; or that the uniform-
ity of Federal authority throughout the parts to it could be preserved; or that without the uniformity,
anarchy and disunion could be prevented." MELVIN 1. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF
LIBERTY: FROM THE FOUNDING TO 1890 150 (2002).
105. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
64(1927).
106. See Akhil Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article IlI: Separating the Two Tiers of Fed-
eral Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 212 (1985); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: De-
fining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 239 (1988).
107. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
108. Id.
109. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 105.
Sensitiveness to "states" rights', fear of rivalry with state courts and respect for state sen-
timent, were swept aside by the great impulse of national feeling born of the Civil War.
Nationalism was triumphant; in national administration was sought its vindication. The
new exertions of federal power were no longer trusted to the enforcement of state agen-
cies.
Id.
110. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (standing doctrine); Textile Work-
ers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (federal question doctrine).
I11. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
112. One rationale behind the federal question doctrine is to ensure that federal courts decide
important federal issues. See Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 457. One rationale behind the standing
doctrine is to preclude federal jurisdiction over litigants to whom federal courts cannot provide a
remedy. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
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I. The Supremacy Clause and Appellate Jurisdiction-
The Uniformity Imperative
Congressional jurisdiction-stripping power is framed by Article
VI' 3 and is rooted in the key debate at the Constitutional Convention
regarding the relationship between the state and federal governments.
Article VI was written to solve many of the problems that arose under
the Articles of Federation and there has been little debate about the fed-
eral courts' important role to ensure the supremacy of federal law." 14
Rather, the debate lies on the appropriate means that federal courts
should use to achieve that end.
Interestingly, the limits that prevent the federal judiciary from as-
serting its supremacy over state courts are judicially created.' '5 Doctrines
such as standing, ripeness, and mootness show that federal courts are
endowed with the authority to create hurdles that determine which cases
they may hear. However, none of these hurdles precludes the enforce-
ment of federal law; they simply determine the way in which cases may
reach federal courts.'1 16 Congress' power to limit access to court is similar
to the Supreme Court's power in that neither Congress nor the federal
courts may create a hurdle that entirely precludes the enforcement of a
federal law.' 17 Doing so would violate Article VI by keeping federal
courts from ensuring that federal law is the "supreme law of the land." 118
Because state laws must comply with the federal Constitution, the
language of the Supremacy Clause and federal judicial review over state
laws indicates that the framers intended that state laws do not conflict
with the supreme law of the country. 1 9 This makes sense, because with-
out a forum in which to ensure that states comply with federal law, the
Supremacy Clause would be an empty statement.
113. U.S CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 ( "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made pursuant thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding.") Id.
114. Indeed, in Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton responded to one problem that ensued
from the lack of a federal judiciary by noting that "[t]hirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction
over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but
contradiction can proceed." THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
115. For example, the standing doctrine, abstention, equitable restraint, and, many would ar-
gue, sovereign immunity.
116. In effect, only cases which present an actual "case or controversy," are not presented too
soon, nor too late.
117. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
118. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
119. Ratner, supra note 71, at 160.
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This proposition is also supported by the legislative history of the
Constitution. The framers were aware of the importance of a uniform
interpretation of federal laws among the states and thus explicitly granted
appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions in order to prevent the
harm that would ensue from allowing state courts to be independent in-
terpreters of federal law.' As Rutledge wrote, the grant of appellate ju-
risdiction over state court judgments ensures "national rights & uniform-
ity of Judgmts."' 12 1
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reinforced this maxim.1 In
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Justice Story reasoned that the Supreme Court
must have the authority to review state court decisions involving federal
questions because if the laws and the Constitution were interpreted dif-
ferently in different states, "The public mischiefs that would attend such
a state of things would be truly deplorable; and it cannot be believed, that
they could have escaped the enlightened convention which formed the
Constitution . . . . [T]he appellate jurisdiction must continue to be the
only adequate remedy for such evils."' 123 Consequently, in order to ensure
that this uniformity exists, at least one federal court must be available to
interpret federal law.' 24
Aside from being constitutionally mandated, the requirement that
one federal forum be open also makes practical sense. If Congress shuts
off federal jurisdiction for a particular issue, the Supremacy Clause still
binds state courts to comply with past federal decisions on the issue
handed down before the removal of federal jurisdiction. 25 State courts
would then be hamstrung. In some cases, they would be required to hear
a case but lack the power to provide the remedy sought. In other cases,
mores, political beliefs, and social conditions may have changed, but
120. Id. at 166.
121. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 124 (Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed.,
1937).
122. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48; Merrel Dow
Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J. Dissenting).
One might argue that [the Supreme] Court's appellate jurisdiction over state-court judg-
ments in cases arising under federal law can be depended upon to correct erroneous state-
court decisions and to insure that federal law is interpreted and applied uniformly. How-
ever, as any experienced observer of this Court can attest, "Supreme Court review of state
courts, limited by docket pressures, narrow review of the facts, the debilitating possibili-
ties of delay, and the necessity of deferring to adequate state grounds of decision, cannot
do the whole job." Currie 160. Indeed, having served on this Court for 30 years, it is clear
to me that, realistically, it cannot even come close to "doing the whole job" and that §
1331 is essential if federal rights are to be adequately protected.
Id.
123. 14 U.S. at 348.
124. See Sager, supra note I1, at 60.
125. Id. at 41.
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without federal courts breaking new ground in these areas, state courts
would either be forced to ignore federal precedent, in derogation of the
Supremacy Clause, or to be bound by antiquated or outmoded case law.
Thus, any congressional act that prevents federal courts from ensuring
the supremacy of federal law would violate Article VI and would
impermissibly alter the balance of power between federal and state
courts.
2. The Power to Heal: Remedies as Constitutional Imperative
The requirement that legal rights are accompanied by the potential
for relief when those rights are violated is a long-standing legal
maxim. 126 In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall penned:
The very essence of liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives
an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that pro-
tection . . . [I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is
a legal right, there is a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, when-
ever that right is invaded . . . [E]very right, when withheld, must
have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress ... The govern-
ment of the United States has been emphatically termed a govern-
ment of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a
vested right. 127
As it relates to congressional power over federal court jurisdiction,
this imperative has two logical consequences. First, Congress cannot re-
move jurisdiction if the result would be to render impossible the en-
forcement of a federal right.1 28 Second, Congress cannot remove jurisdic-
tion when, by relegating an issue to state court, the litigants would be
deprived of their due process rights.129
Recent sovereign immunity case law indicates that the Supreme
Court adheres to these maxims.1 30 In Seminole Tribe, for example, the
Court based much of its decision denying litigants' the ability to enforce
congressionally created private rights of action against the state on the
126. Indeed, Akhil Amar echoed this sentiment when he wrote, "Few propositions of law are
as basic today-and were as basic and universally embraced two hundred years ago-as the ancient
legal maxim, ubijus, ibi remedium: Where there is a right, should be a remedy." Akhil Reed Amar,
Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1485-86 (1987).
127. 5 U.S. 137, 162-63 (1803).
128. Hart, supra note 8, at 1366.
129. Sager, supra note 11, at 66; Hart, supra note 8, at 1387 ("If the court finds that what is
being done is invalid, its duty is simply to declare the jurisdictional limitation invalid also, and then
proceed under the general grant ofjurisdiction.") Id.
130. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Flav. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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rationale that the federal government could still enforce the right.' 3 ' Inte-
gral to that rationale, however, is the principle that rights require reme-
dies. 32 As Professor Redish first noted, Congress does not have the
power to limit federal jurisdiction when state courts cannot provide the
remedy sought, assuming the plaintiff has a due process right to that
remedy. 133 American citizens have due process rights for any deprivation
of their "Life, Liberty, or Property,"' 13 4 as well as any deprivation of a
"fundamental right."'' 35 Thus, an act violates litigants' due process rights
if state courts bear the sole responsibility for adjudicating cases involving
fundamental rights, but lack the ability to remedy those violated funda-
mental rights.
IV. THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTION WALTZ:
APPLICATION OF THEORY TO FACT
If a federal court were faced with an act stripping it of jurisdiction
over a certain subject matter, the court must take a three-step approach to
determine if the act is constitutional. First, the court must determine if
the act, on its face, impermissibly alters the balance of power in the tri-
partite constitutional plan. Second, if the act passes this test, the court
must determine if the act abridges an essential function of the court itself
Finally, the court must look at the intent and function of the act to deter-
mine if it violates any individual constitutional liberty. The following
section will apply this three-part test to House Bill 3313 and ultimately
conclude that the bill fails at every step of the test.
A. Interbranch Analysis
House Bill 3313 alters the constitutional balance of power by at-
tempting to achieve through ordinary legislation what otherwise would
require constitutional amendment. At the threshold level, a reviewing
court must either accept the act as valid and immediately disclaim all
jurisdiction or review the constitutionality of the jurisdiction-stripping
act itself.' 36 Because judicial review is a constitutional imperative, 137 the
131. Id. at 73.
132. Amar, supra note 126, at 1485.
133. Redish & Woods, supra note 13, at 5 1.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
135. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
136. Hart, supra note 8, at 1387.
Obviously, the answer is that the validity of the jurisdictional limitation depends on the
validity of the program itself, or the particular part of it in question. If the court finds that
what is being done is invalid, its duty is simply to declare the jurisdictional limitation in-
valid also, and then proceed under the general grant ofjurisdiction.
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court must choose the latter option. If the court were to choose the for-
mer, it would find itself on the horns of a separation of powers di-
lemma. 38 By choosing to accept the jurisdictional limitation, the court
will have effectively sounded its own death knell by inexorably shifting
the balance of power to Congress to such a degree that federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, may be rendered irrelevant through con-
gressional fiat.' 39 Therefore, the very act of acquiescing to a removal of
subject matter jurisdiction would itself be unconstitutional. 4°
More importantly, the intended and likely effect of House Bill 3313
is that of a de facto constitutional amendment because the bill denies
federal courts the power to enforce federal law.14' As of November 2,
2005, seventeen states have amended their Constitution to define mar-
riage as between a man and a woman. 42 In light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Lawrence v. Texas, however, it is possible that upcoming
federal constitutional law will invalidate those state constitutional
amendments. 143
137. See supra Part Ill.
138. See id.
139. See generally Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
140. An interesting situation arises, however, if federal courts abide by the Act. It would be
folly to assume that federal courts operate entirely outside the political atmosphere in this country,
and, considering the overwhelming majority by which state constitutional amendments prohibiting
same-sex marriage have passed, it is not inconceivable, or even unlikely, that a federal court judge
would choose to abide by a jurisdiction stripping act rather than to confront a potential equal protec-
tion dilemma, in light of Lawrence v. Texas. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Furthermore, it is not unlikely
that, considering the tenuous 5-4 margins in gay rights cases such as Lawrence and Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 6 (1996), that the Supreme Court itself might legitimate such a Congressional act for the
same politico-social reason that a lower federal court judge might. See Romer, 517 U.S at 644
(Scalia, J., dissenting), stating
But I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible-murder, for ex-
ample, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals-and could exhibit even "animus" toward such
conduct. Surely that is the only sort of "animus" at issue here: moral disapproval of ho-
mosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries-old
criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers.
Id.
141. Redish & Woods, supra note 13, at 51-52.
142. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The states are Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin. Id.
143. But see Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is "no legitimate state interest" for pur-
poses of proscribing that conduct; and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of
neutrality), "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,"
what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homo-
sexual couples exercising "[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution."
Id. at 604-05.
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In fact, many political conservatives are fearful that the Court's de-
cision in Lawrence will lead to an invalidation of the provision in the
DOMA 144 that overrides the Full Faith and Credit 45 provision of the
Constitution. 146 Indeed, John Hostettler, the Congressman who proposed
House Bill 3313, said its purpose is "to keep federal courts from impos-
ing homosexual marriages on Indiana and the rest of the country."' 147
Even if House Bill 3313 is enacted before any same-sex marriage
cases reach the federal courts, its de facto constitutional effect would be
the same because it would insulate DOMA from judicial review. Al-
though marriage has traditionally been an area legislated exclusively by
the states,148 current fears that DOMA will be overturned or that states
prohibiting same-sex marriage will be forced to recognize another state's
legal same-sex marriages have led the President and lawmakers to push
for a federal constitutional amendment defining marriage as between a
man and a woman. 149 However, passage of House Bill 3313 would ren-
der the constitutional amendment process moot; Congress could effec-
tively insulate DOMA from review and the feared consequence of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence could be avoided.
The framers believed that the Constitution's longevity was predi-
cated on its short-term immutability.' 50 Constitutional change requires a
144. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as I U.S.C. § 7 (2005); 28 U.S.C.
1738(c) (2005)).
145. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.") Id.
146. When the Massachusetts State Supreme Court, in Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (2003), ruled that same-sex marriage was a constitutional right, it opened the door to
constitutional challenges to DOMA. See generally Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA4): The Next Battlegroundfor Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARVARD L. REV. 2684 (2004).
Until recently, DOMA was effectively unchallengeable by the individuals subjected to its
stigma .... Now the time is ripe for a constitutional challenge to DOMA .... DOMA
violates principles of equal protection and due process. A strong case can also be made
that DOMA abuses the Full Faith and Credit Clause and contravenes fundamental princi-
ples of federalism. A successful equal protection or due process challenge, however, is
likely to have the farthest-reaching implications for the future of same-sex marriage in
two respects. First, if DOMA is found to violate equal protection or due process, the state
DOMAs are likely to fall on the same grounds. And second, it is difficult to imagine how
the Court could find excluding same-sex couples from the definition of marriage uncon-
stitutional without creating a constitutional requirement that same-sex couples be allowed
to marry.
Id. at 2687-88.
147. See Hostettler, supra note 6. Considering the fact that Goodridge and the Multnomah
County, Oregon decision to issue marriage licenses in Li. v. State, No. 0403-03057, 2004 WL
1258167 (Or. Cir. 2004), may very well go before the Supreme Court, Representative Hostettler's
fears are not unfounded.
148. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978).
149. Remarks, supra note 96.
150. See supra Part II1.
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supermajority to ensure that disfavored minorities like homosexuals are
protected from the tyranny and caprice of the majority. The process of
amending the Constitution is inherently political and potentially politi-
cally dangerous. Because the process is widely scrutinized, it naturally
requires legislators to be much more guarded in their support or dis-
sent.' 5' This intense focus on the amendment process is a very power-
ful-perhaps the most powerful-check on the legislative branch. 52 The
requirement that three-fourths of the states ratify constitutional amend-
ments is the quintessence of this legislative check. 53 Because depriving
federal courts of jurisdiction to hear same-sex marriage cases achieves
the same goal as the proposed constitutional amendment, but circum-
vents the check of the three-fourths majority requirement, House Bill
3313 impermissibly alters the balance of power among the branches of
government.
B. Intrabranch Analysis
House Bill 3313 abridges the essential functions of both lower fed-
eral courts and the Supreme Court by denying those courts the ability to
enforce the supremacy of federal law and provide remedies for violations
of constitutional rights. This section will briefly address how House Bill
3313 may frustrate litigants' ability to achieve sought remedies and then
discuss in more detail how House Bill 3313 violates Article VI.
By relegating same-sex marriage cases to state courts, House Bill
3313 may prevent litigants from availing themselves of federal remedial
structures. A victorious state court plaintiff could be prevented from hav-
ing her judgment enforced under the logic of Tarble's Case.154 Because,
as shown above, plaintiffs have a fundamental right to the possibility of
achieving the remedy sought, any congressional act that prevents liti-
gants from enforcing their claim must be unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the Founding Fathers wrote Article VI to ensure "na-
tional rights & uniformity of Judgmts."'' 55 Although it can be argued that
marriage is an inherently state issue and not subject to Article VI's uni-
151. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (detail-
ing how making the amendment process difficult ensures stability within the union); THE
FEDERALIST No. 50 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (outlining
how difficult it is politically to amend a Constitution).
152. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 50 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
153. U.S. CONST, art. V.
154. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); see discussion supra Part I1.C.
155. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 124 (1911).
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formity imperative, Article VI applies equally to state court applications
of federal constitutional law. 15
6
The rationale behind Article VI is to make sure that state and fed-
eral courts apply federal law in a consistent manner.157 House Bill 3313
frustrates the purpose of Article VI by preventing federal courts from
exercising the only powers they wield over state courts: judicial review
and, implicitly, stare decisis. 58 In thirty-eight states, Supreme Court
judges are elected to their posts. 59 In the wake of the eleven state consti-
tutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, many of which were
overwhelmingly passed, it is possible that many state court judges would
ignore the requirements of Article VI and the protections of the Bill of
Rights and let realpolitik rule, rather than the Constitution. 6 0 Though
this possibility already exists to some degree,16 it is tempered by federal
review of state court decisions and stare decisis. If state court judges
were isolated from federal court review, it seems significantly more
likely that state judges would ignore federal precedent and allow Article
VI to fall by the wayside in order to secure reelection. Nevertheless, even
if state court judges continued to abide by the federal constitution, by
isolating those judges from federal review, House Bill 3313 renders Arti-
cle VI an empty statement; without the possibility for federal review, the
only force requiring state courts to adhere to the federal Constitution is
its good will. Because Article VI is the keystone of the state-federal judi-
cial hierarchy, any act that makes Article VI obsolete necessarily alters
the intrajudicial balance of power, and is therefore unconstitutional.
156. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.").
157. THE FEDERALIST NO. I (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
158. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 137 (1803).
159. Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, Top Legal Organizations Express Concern
About Impact of Supreme Court's White Decision on Fair and Impartial Courts (June 27, 2002)
[hereinafter Brennan Center Press Release], at http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_
2002/pressrelease_2002_0525.html.
160. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163 ("The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men."). Id.
161. That Roy Moore, the Alabama Supreme Court justice, erected a Ten Commandments
statue outside the Alabama Supreme Court courthouse and posted the Ten Commandments in his
courtroom is evidence that this concern is well founded. Associated Press, Alabama Chief Justice
Unveils Ten Commandments in State Supreme Court, Fox NEWS, Aug. 1, 2001, at http://
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,31137,00.html.
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C. Facial Constitutionality Analysis
Finally, House Bill 3313 violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments' procedural due process guarantee.162 House Bill 3313 deprives
litigants of their procedural due process rights because it deprives them
of the opportunity for a meaningful hearing from an impartial decision
maker.
The Supreme Court has held that the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that all litigants receive notice
of the hearing,' 63 opportunity for a meaningful hearing,164 and an impar-
tial decision maker. 65 House Bill 3313 does not violate the Due Process
requirement of notice. However, by relegating same-sex marriage cases
to state courts, House Bill 3313 potentially deprives litigants of the right
to a meaningful hearing and the right to an impartial decision maker.
Beginning with the worst-case scenario, if House Bill 3313 were
passed and if a state followed suit and passed a similar statute prohibiting
state courts from hearing same-sex marriage cases, any potential litigant
in a same-sex case would be deprived of any process. Under this sce-
nario, at least one of the Acts, either House Bill 3313 or the state equiva-
lent, must be overturned. However, still in question is the situation in
which the state forum is available, but is inherently biased?
Until fairly recently in our nation's history, African-American de-
fendants in southern courts were almost presumptively guilty. 116 Con-
gress' creation of a federal cause of action under the Civil Rights Act 16 7
indicated its intent to remove civil rights cases from the dockets of then-
racist southern judges.1 68 Despite the Article VI requirement that all
judges, both state and federal, be bound by the federal Constitution, dur-
ing the tumultuous post Brown v. Board of Education 69 era, southern
judges overtly ignored the Supreme Court's declarations and deci-
sions. 170 Though the disapprobation many feel towards homosexuals to-
162. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
163. See, e.g., Mullhane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
164. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
165. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
166. See e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
167.42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
168. See, e.g., PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE
AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1999); ROBERT D. LOEVY, To END ALL
SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1990); JAMES L.
SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON YEARS 259-71
(1968) (discussing the historical and legislative processes driving the creation of the Act).
169. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
170. See e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Grif-
fin v. Prince Edward County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958).
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day probably does not match the virulence of the racism that divided
America during the last century, "homophobia" is still a powerful force
at work in our country. That eleven states passed constitutional amend-
ments prohibiting same-sex marriages, some by vast margins, and that a
majority of the House of Representatives passed House Bill 3313, which
expressly discriminates against homosexuals, is evidence of the degree of
prejudice against homosexuals that exists in America today. The ques-
tion, then, is whether state judges are likely to be so influenced by their
own or by society's animus towards homosexuals that it will render some
state courts biased. It is true that many judges do not consider their re-
election prospects when deciding cases. However, insulating state court
decisions from judicial review incentivizes the politicization of state ju-
diciaries.
Supreme Court judges in thirty-eight states are directly elected. 7'
Until recently it was common practice for candidate-judges to remain
silent about their political views and most state statutes require this si-
lence. 7 2 In fact, the old American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code
of Judicial Conduct prohibited judges and judicial candidates from en-
gaging in any inherently political activities such as announcing their po-
litical or judicial views, even during their own elections. 73 In Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White,174 however, the Supreme Court held that
laws proscribing candidate-judges from discussing their judicial or po-
litical views violated the First Amendment.' 75 As a result, in thirty-eight
states, the process of becoming and remaining a judge has become inher-
ently more political and those states' judges have become necessarily and
increasingly tied to the political will of the majority. In White's wake, the
ABA rewrote its Model Code of Judicial Conduct and legal scholars be-
gan questioning whether elected judges, now increasingly political, could
be nonbiased decision makers.' 76 In light of the general animus much of
the population feels towards homosexuals and same-sex marriage and the
increasingly political nature of state judgeships, it is possible that many
state fora can no longer be considered fair for the purposes of due proc-
ess.
171. Brennan Center Press Release, supra note 159.
172. American Bar Association, Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations Addressing
State Judicial Independence Problems, at http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/r6c.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2005).
173. Id.; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2000).
174. 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (holding unconstitutional a Minnesota law prohibiting judicial candi-
dates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues).
175. Id.
176. Brennan Center Press Release, supra note 159.
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V. CONCLUSION
Under Article III, Congress clearly has power to shape federal court
jurisdiction, and for fifty years, commentators have debated how far
Congress' power extends. What those commentators had in common is
that they did not look beyond the relationship between Congress and the
judiciary. This Comment attempts to take a more holistic approach in
delimiting Congress' jurisdictional powers. Ultimately, Congress' juris-
dictional authority is bound by three requirements. First, Congress can-
not alter federal jurisdiction in such a way that will affect the balance of
power within the tripartite constitutional system. Second, Congress can-
not alter federal jurisdiction in such a way that it will affect the balance
of power between federal and state courts. Finally, Congress cannot
change federal jurisdiction in such a way that deprives citizens of their
constitutional rights. Applying this three-step approach to House Bill
3313, it is clear that the Act impermissibly alters both the interbrach and
intrabranch functions of the federal judiciary and would deprive homo-
sexual litigants of their individual constitutional rights.
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